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Adam St. Onge, Bill Stackpole, Sylvia Perez-Hardy, Daryl Johnson
Rochester Institute of Technology
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Abstract
The weakest link in detecting Botnets is typically the communication channel. What if there was
a possibility to leverage existing high volume communication channels such as social networks for the
command and control traffic of a botnet? Utilizing a social network such as Twitter, has many
advantages over alternative methods, when done properly it is easier to hide in plain site due to the high
volume of normal chatter, the protocol and traffic is already established as a known protocol to many
security systems and antivirus software, and it is highly available across the globe. Twitter is aware of
their potential for people using their network for nefarious purposes so they have developed a series of
advanced protection mechanisms that need to be bypassed. The simplest solution would be to acquire an
API key for access to programmatically post and fetch messages to Twitter but that would introduce a
substantial weakness to the system. In the event that the traffic was identified once, Twitter could
withdraw the API key and effectively shut down the botnet. To avoid this weakness we utilized web
scraping technology and the mobile web site of twitter, which has a smaller set of protection mechanisms.
The system is implemented in Python utilizing an open source library, Mechanize to scrape the mobile
web site. There were challenges encountered in successfully accessing Twitter’s web site that are shown.
New social networks are being built everyday and the opportunity for utilizing these types of networks for
communications of botnets presents a large opportunity and ultimately an urgent need for these network
owners to become aware of the potential uses of their systems.
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1 Introduction
Botnets are one of the most dangerous emerging threats on the internet with millions of
compromised PCs under the control of botnet masters. This produces a steadily advancing cat
and mouse game between botnet masters and security professionals to advance the technology of
botnets to avoid detection. The most common method of detection for botnets is detecting the
network traffic of the botnets communicating with one central host. IRC is a typical channel that
Botnets have used to communicate, which has resulted in an evolution of detection methods.
Intrusion detection software such as Snort, is able to reliably create rules to detect client and
server communication channels such as IRC. This has triggered botnets to evolve and become
distributed. One such example of the distributed model is botnets that communicate with each
other by forming ad-hoc peer to peer networks. This is a very hard to detect model of
communication but also a fairly complex configuration.
What if instead of having to create a complex system to communicate and mask
command and control traffic, a botnet could hide in plain site? Leverage a pre-existing and
highly popular social network to post innocuous looking messages. These messages could then
be searched for by nodes in the botnet and then taken action based on the message. I set out to
explore this very concept, to understand if it would be possible to post command and control
traffic to Twitter undetected.
Twitter is a massive social network with over 280 million active users with 135,000 more
signing up every day and sending over 500 million tweets per day into the public timeline. [11]
Users are free to post as frequently as they desire as long as they stay within the constraint of 140
characters per “tweet” or message sent. This has resulted in billions of tweets published on the
platform. In such a noisy and dense environment, it is the perfect place for a botnet to
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communicate in plain site up to thousands of times a day, and still not be a blip on Twitter’s
radar.

2 Background
Existing work in the field of botnet research has primarily been focused on the
monitoring and detection of botnets. Researchers such as Lu, Tavallaee, and Ghorbani [3] have
proposed systems that potentially can automatically detect botnet activity and alert on these
conditions but in advanced peer to peer botnets this activity can be difficult to detect as well as
generate a lot of false positives. The methodology in this study used a cross association of
source IP addresses with destination IP addresses, then a second association between source and
destination ports. They then used a sparse binary matrix to represent the association of this data.
Once they had the results of this study they categorized the resulting data sets by content and
passed this into their algorithm for analysis. The algorithm evaluates the response time and the
distribution of the communications to identify botnet traffic, since botnets typically have a much
higher response time than human users, and typically communicate with a much more diverse set
of nodes. The outcome of this research shows that this approach is somewhat successful for
detecting known and unknown botnet activity. It is highly successful in detecting IRC botnet
activity with a near 100% detection rate and low false positive rate.

2a Related Works
“BotGrep” [4] is another research paper from Nagaraja et all, that specifically targets
peer to peer botnet detection. The methodology for BotGrep is to gather data as close to the
backbone of the internet as possible, perform graph analysis on the data, and then in turn

Page 4

leverage their custom algorithm on the composed graph data to identify botnet traffic. Botgrep is
especially good for large scale data analysis, using a 3.8 million host dataset. The false positive
rate was 0.09 but scaled up to 30 million the rate dropped to 0.01. The outcome of this research
suggests that this is an effective methodology for detecting peer to peer botnet activity but it can
lead to detection of other peer to peer activity that may not be related to botnets.
Thomas and Nicol[5] provide research in the usage of social networks as the medium for
botnets, with both command and control activity, as well as infection mechanisms. This research
provides an insightful look into how botnet masters leverage the many communication channels
of a social network to control bots, as well as propagate. Their focus was specifically on the
spamming botnet “Koobface”. Their methodology was to create imposter zombie machines that
they could control and have them join the Koobface botnet. After successfully joining the botnet
they performed monitoring on the communications and the actions that the bots took while
infected. The outcome of the research demonstrates that while Koobface relies on social
networks to deliver spam and spread infections, it is heavily reliant on “compromised hosts for
C&C servers, spam redirectors, and zombies…As hosts become discovered and taken down, new
hosts must be compromised to replenish lost resources.”[5] This is a weak point in they system,
one in which I propose to work around by using the infrastructure of a social network like
Twitter as the communication mechanism.
IRC based botnets provide an identifiable footprint that security software has been
successful in detecting. Waldecker[10] demonstrates the weaknesses in host based detection via
antivirus software due to the tight coupling with the signature patterns. Showing how
susceptible the system is to failure when the smallest modification is made to the binaries, thus
causing the signature pattern to miss the botnet software. IRC specific detection methods can be
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successful due to the expected behavior patterns of a human communication channel. “the
response time of the IRC response can be measured, because the response time of malicious
software is faster than the time of a human.” [10] The complexity required to successfully detect
a protocol that is centralized reflects the difficulty of the problem for a solution that can
successfully decentralize itself.
Some of the more interesting developing topics in botnets occur in the specific detection
and profiling of the command and control traffic alone. Tsai, Lin, and Mao[7] created a proof of
concept tool called “C&C tracer” that provides the capability to perform analysis on DNS names
to test the likelihood of the traffic being associated with a botnet. This is accomplished via three
components in the C&C tracer tool, “CAFE: receives different sources of malicious URLs
observed and identiﬁed as C&C domain name in order to generate spatial and temporal features.
DNSQ: an action component for querying the status of domain names from the external data
repository, such as DNS and Team-Cymru Whois database. CSTA: an analysis component for
analyzing the status of traced C&C domain names whether require to the further tracing or
not.”[7] Through these components the url and activity is disected for known blacklists, known
network port activity, url string rendering for classification, and analysis against similar
blacklisted domains. The outcome of this research is that the tool was successful at analyzing
and detecting botnet urls in most cases. Its weaknesses are in domains that fail to answer to dns
queries and potentially new botnets with whom there is no created blacklist or signature.
Vo and Pieprzyk [6] provide similar research to the proposed topic with their paper
“Protecting Web 2.0 Services from Botnet Exploitations”. This paper focuses on providing a
protection mechanism to social networks from botnets that seek to leverage their social network
as a delivery mechanism for communication or propagation. This research also discusses one
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botnet that in 2009 used Twitter as a command and control system. [7] This botnet is a
representation of the work I plan to study in my creation of the command and control mechanism
via Twitter. The methodology used in this research is a proposed system to protect social
networks from being utilized by botnets. This system consists of a series of captchas that require
completion at the time of posting an update to a social network. The outcome of this research is
highly effective for stopping automated systems such as bots from being able to post but
introduces questions about real world utilization as this could be viewed as not user friendly for
the average social network user.

3 Twitter as Command and Control

3a. Approach
There were many options that a botnet could use a social network as a command and
control mechanism but ensuring that it was resilient to detection, no single point of failure, and
flexible were important to the project. The simplest possible approach would be to request an
API key from twitter to publish tweets directly through their public web services API. This has
the benefit of being very reliable and consistent for publishing to the Twitter timeline and would
be easily leveraged by any modern programming language ensuring flexibility. The issue with
this approach is that it establishes a single point of failure for the system. In the event that
Twitter detected the botnet was using their network for command and control traffic, and they
were able to correlate that the publisher account and subscribers were leveraging a common API
key, that key could then be revoked. This would cut off all access for the botnet and it’s nodes
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from Twitter rendering the system useless. This risk is too great to rely on this option and likely
would have led to failure.
Considering the weakness of the API key, it was important to design a system that could
publish and read tweets from the system without a single point of failure. The Twitter web
interface presented an opportunity whereas anyone can browse a user’s timeline and read their
tweets without authenticating or requiring API access. In order to publish a tweet into the
system a user must authenticate with a web form, so an account would still be required to publish
a tweet. This can easily be gained by compromising existing accounts or registering new
accounts manually as needed. The next step was to find a way to programmatically publish the
tweet with a set of provided account credentials.

3b Injecting Commands into Twitter
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Utilizing Twitter’s web interface opened up the possibility of performing the three
required functions, login, search, and post without a single point of failure. The next question
was how to programmatically perform these functions that were designed to be performed

manually using a web browser? Luckily Python contains a rich programmatic web browser,
Mechanize, which can mimic a user utilizing a web browser session. The simplest solution
would be to utilize the Mechanize library to simulate a login given a provided set of credentials,
and upon successful authentication then post a tweet to the user’s timeline.
Twitter has a long history of struggling with people trying to send spam into the system
and they have been evolving their anti-spam protections steadily. These protection methods are
designed to combat exactly what we are trying to do with Mechanize to simulate a login and post
a tweet programatically. Mechanize has the ability to detect what forms exist on a particular web
page, this simplifies the scraping of the web forms for programmatic input. This approach also
opens up the flexibility to be able to replace compromised user accounts with ease. This is much
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more flexible than the API key approach because user accounts can be either generated or
compromised in advanced, building up a collection of accounts that can be used in the event of
Twitter shutting down one of the accounts.

3c. Login Approach
The standard Twitter web login form has strong anti-scraping javascript technology
deployed so that a random javascript key is generated as a hidden form value for each form
presentation. This is a limitation of the Mechanize and other libraries which do not have full
javascript engines to be able to run these scripts. This was the initial stumbling block in the
approach to scrape the Twitter login page.
After some careful consideration I explored the mobile version of the Twitter website and
found that it did not consistently use the same anti-scraping javascript technology. Through
testing of different user agents I noticed that there were occurrences where there was no antiscraping javascript present, most likely so that the Twitter mobile site would be functional on
older mobile browsers. I eventually settled on the agent string of ‘Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux
i686; en-US; rv:1.9.0.1) Gecko/2008071615 Fedora/3.0.1-1.fc9 Firefox/3.0.1’ which is a really
old and simple version of Firefox from 2008. This combination of browser version and Linux
platform triggered the Twitter web servers not to inject the javascript anti-scraping technology
into the pages.
class browser:
def __init__(self):
# Browser
self.br = mechanize.Browser()
# Cookie Jar
cj = cookielib.LWPCookieJar()
Page 10

self.br.set_cookiejar(cj)
# Browser options
self.br.set_handle_equiv(True)
self.br.set_handle_redirect(True)
self.br.set_handle_referer(True)
self.br.set_handle_robots(False)
self.br.set_debug_redirects(True)
# Follows refresh
self.br.set_handle_refresh(mechanize._http.HTTPRefreshProcessor(), max_time=1)
# User-Agent
self.br.addheaders = [('User-agent', 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.0.1)
Gecko/2008071615 Fedora/3.0.1-1.fc9 Firefox/3.0.1')]
This meant that I was able to scrape the page, determine the appropriate form elements for the
login using the mechanize library and submit the form with the previously obtained credentials.
def login(self):
# Open mobile twitter login page
r = self.br.open('https://mobile.twitter.com/session/new')
html = r.read()
# Select the login form and pass in credentials
self.br.select_form(nr=0)
self.br.form['username'] = "TweetBotMaster3"
self.br.form['password'] = “************”
response = self.br.submit()
The next objective was to generate a uniquely identifiable hashtag which would allow the
members of the botnet to search Twitter for specific hashtags fresh each day and know that the
hashtag has been sourced from within the botnet. This would allow for a truly distributed system
across the Twitter platform that would be undetectable without cracking the algorithm but still
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leave a unique fingerprint behind on tweets that members of the botnet could discover for
command and control traffic.
The algorithm is seeded with three values, a specified salt string, “thesisbot” for the sake
of testing, the string representation of the UTC value of the current day, and the string
representation of the UTC weekday indicator(e.g. Monday is 0, Tuesday is 1, etc). Those three
strings are concatenated together to form the seed value for the algorithm, which is then run
through a SHA1 algorithm to generate a hex digest value.

def buildHashTag(self):
now = datetime.datetime.utcnow().date()
#print now.weekday() # 0=Monday
pretext = "thesisbot" + str(now.day) + str(now.weekday())
hashed = sha1(pretext).hexdigest()
return hashed
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Once the hashtag has been generated, we can then compose the command and control
traffic that we would like to post. Due to the nature of Twitter and it’s limitations of a 140
characters, fitting plain text command traffic into the body of a tweet would be limited, although
still very useful. The botnet master could supply simplistic plain text commands in the tweet
bodies to perform operations such as changing the intervals that the bots check in, triggering the
bots to sleep for a specified interval, or changing the string that is used to seed the hashtag. The
most useful scenario is for the botnet master to provide a link in the body of the tweet. This link
could refer to an expanded command set outside the constraints of the 140 characters of Twitter
or it could link directly to a script or binary executable that all of the clients could run. For
testing purposes a link was provided, a python script was downloaded, then executed by all
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clients. Twitter rate limits the number of requests per 15 minute interval to 15 requests[12], thus
the most effective option would be to utilize a link for communications which is the focus of this
project.
The botnet client would run the TweetBotClient.py script on a regular interval by
injecting an entry into the system scheduler. The client needs to be able to search the Twitter
timeline for tweets containing the calculated hash tag for the day. This is accomplished by
scraping the Twitter search website, detecting the form for the search box, and submitting a
request to search Twitter for the appropriate hash tag. If there are results to this search query
then the commands are processed as specified.
def search(self,term):
tweets = []
#url = 'https://mobile.twitter.com/search?q='
url = 'https://twitter.com/search/realtime?q='
if(term[0] == '#'):
url = url + '%23' + term[1:] + '&src=typd'
print url
else:
url = url + term + '&src=typd'
print url
searchResultsPage = self.br.open(url)
html = searchResultsPage.read()
soup = BeautifulSoup(html)
#print soup
tweetBody=None
username=None
for content in soup.findAll("div",{"class":"content"}):
for pContent in content.findAll("p",{"class":"js-tweet-text"}):
if(pContent.get_text() is not None):
#print pContent.get_text()
#tweets.append(div.get_text())
tweetBody = pContent.get_text()
for uName in content.findAll("span",{"class":"username js-action-profile-name"}):
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username = uName.get_text()
if(tweetBody is not None) and (username is not None):
tweetDict = {username:tweetBody}
tweets.append(tweetDict)
return tweets
def downloadFile(self,url):
# Grab the file from the url, read it in, and write it to a file
splitURL = url.split('/')
response = urllib2.urlopen(url)
fileContents = response.read()
outputFile = open(splitURL[-1],'wb')
outputFile.write(fileContents)
outputFile.close()
os.system(outputFile)

3d Spam systems
Twitter’s platform is one that is highly valuable to malware and spam creators
which has resulted in Twitter building some robust defensive techniques to defeat spam.
These same methods also make it difficult for a botnet to communicate.
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Twitter selectively filters what results show up in search results based on three
criteria, a user’s activity on the platform (tweets, retweets, and mentions), their
completeness of their Twitter bio, and their account age. Through some trial and error
testing it was determined that this filtering is especially active when the user’s tweet
contains a link in the body of the tweet. Given the approach of this research is to leverage
new accounts for botnet communications, it is highly likely that these tweets would be
filtered. In the testing it was noticed that tweets sent without a link, were not having the
same level of filtering applied to them, and given the right parameter to include “all users”,
these tweets would be visible to all users. Thus the approach was created to manipulate the
link address so that it would appear not to be a link at all, and then Twitter’s anti-spam
filtering methods would not flag the tweet to not be indexed for search. This was
accomplished by replacing the substring “http://” with “bot://” and then adding the
functionality into the client code to replace “bot://” back with “http://” before processing
the tweet for commands.

3e Defense
Defending against a Twitter client botnet can be successful but not without sacrificing a
high percentage of false positives. Since the botnet client software uses a typical web session to
connect to Twitter this is difficult to identify as suspicious traffic outside of the host. Thus
network detection systems and intrusion protection systems would not be able to write rules
blocking this activity without incorrectly blocking normal Twitter traffic. There is the potential
for some heuristics to be created using host based firewall traffic, that has a much lower level
risk of false positives.
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The most effective methodology would be the attack the hash algorithm. If an entity
were to be able to crack the hashing algorithm and detect the input strings for the SHA1 function
then they could generate their own messages that would be followed by the bots in the network.
This could be used to dismantle the network. Exploiting the refresh frequency for the hash is
another possible vector. Currently a new hash is generated on a daily basis, so if an entity were
to be able to detect a message belonging to the network with a recent hash, then they could
compose a message before the hash expiration that would be executed by the bots in the network.
This could be enhanced to make a more robust input string that is refreshed on a more aggressive
cycle thus hardening the system against these attacks.
Without understanding the nature of the Twitter network a reverse dictionary attack could
seem effective. If an entity were to search the Twitter public timeline for any tweets containing
12 continuous characters that does not correspond to a word in any language’s dictionary, then in
theory the hashes would be discovered on the network. The flaw in this logic is that Twitter
users make heavy usage of multi-word hash tags to add context to their tweet, these hash tags are
typically compressed into a single string thus appearing to a linguistic processor as an invalid
word but in reality these are incredibly common in the Twitter network.
The best approach is to protect against this type of traffic in a consumer situation would
be to use a white list based client firewall, such as “Little Snitch” for OS X which blocks all
network traffic by default and the user can selectively permit traffic as appropriate. This way the
traffic to Twitter could be correctly approved from a web browser session or a local Twitter
client, but would be denied by any other originating piece of software.
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In a corporate environment it would be suggested to block or aggressively filter social
network communications to prevent these types of functions. This would be very effective at
preventing proliferation inside of a corporate network.

4 Evaluation
Full end to end testing was conducted using the scenario in which a Twitter account was
previously compromised through other means, and assumed control of the botnet by utilizing a
python script for command and control of the bots in the network. The test also assumes that an
up to date Windows 7 machine with the built in Firewall turned on was compromised through
some other means, and the botnet client script is active on the machine.
The botnet master published to Twitter utilizing the TweetBot.py script which logged
into Twitter through the mobile interface, composed the appropriate hash tag for the day, and
posted the specified message.
On the Windows 7 machine, the TweetBotClient.py script was running in the background
undetected by the Windows built in firewall and was successfully polling Twitter to search for
the calculated hash tag of the day. The Windows firewall does not detect the polling activity as
malicious because it appears to be typical outbound web traffic. There is nothing that is even
suspicious about this traffic since it is taking advantage of standard web interfaces to receive
commands and download binaries. The firewall would be much more likely to detect and block
this activity if it were on a higher probability channel, such as IRC. Once it detected a hash tag
that matched the appropriate hash tag for that day, it parsed the tweet and turned the command
into action. In the test scenario a message was posted that included a URL. The URL was a
download reference to a python script that the client should download and execute. In the test
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scenario the client successfully downloaded the python script and executed the script without
detection from the Windows firewall.

5 Conclusions
The test was successful in bypassing detection from the Windows OS and built in firewall
which is a typical level of protection for many Windows users. The test also successfully
demonstrated that the Twitter anti-scraping protections can be bypassed, resulting in unlimited
access to post messages to the Twitter timeline. Most importantly this mechanism cannot be
easily defeated since it takes advantage in the backwards compatibility support of the Twitter
mobile website, triggering the website to remove the javascript anti-scraping technology. If an
account is detected to be part of the botnet, another account can be compromised and assume
control of the botnet. This creates a flexible moving target that can be highly distributed in the
Twitter network. Clients would be very difficult to detect and identify as they are simply
performing a search request via the Twitter website that appears as normal traffic.

6 Future Trends
The evolution of botnet communication is a fast moving target that is keeping security
professionals on their toes. Utilizing social networks is just one of the many emerging areas for
botnet communications. As we move closer into the post-pc era, particularly with the advent of
mobile computing, botnets will be forced to adapt as well. The next step in innovation will be at
the mobile device layer. Smart phones and tablets are proliferating our society with an always
on internet connection making a great target for attackers. They are able to leverage older style
communication channels such as TCP and HTTP as well as new opportunities such as SMS and
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push notifications. A botnet using exclusively push notifications as a command and control
channel would be very difficult to detect on a large scale and could provide some of the same
benefits, such as 3rd party infrastructure and obfuscation, as using a social network as the
communication channel. There is plenty of room for botnet communications to grow and
exciting opportunities for research.
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